Kültür Sanat Edebiyat Şiir

medeniyetler çatışması sizce ne demek, medeniyetler çatışması size neyi çağrıştırıyor?

medeniyetler çatışması terimi Dadasdasdasd tarafından tarihinde eklendi

  • Erdem Ülkün
    Erdem Ülkün

    Medeniyetler asla çatışmazlar.çatışan madeniyetler değil,politik-ekonomik sınıfsal çıkarlardır.

  • Bir Kara Karga
    Bir Kara Karga

    karıştık...şükür ki insanlıkla karıştık..çatışmadık, karıştık...çatıştık ama yinede karıştık

  • Metin Tok
    Metin Tok

    Sovyiet rejiminden sonra oluşmaya başlayan yeni dünyayı anlamak için Hunigton tarafından ele alınmış, medeniyet paradigmasının anlatıldığı kitap. Çok zekice yaklaşımların var olduğunu düşünüyorum.Ama Türk tarihi hakkında bazı önyargı ve yanlışlarda mevcut. Kitabınıon başında bütün anlattıklarının hipotez olduğunu söylüyor,günümüz dünyasıda hipotezlerin doğruluğunu ispatlıyor.Ya da Batı medeniyeti bu kitabı baz alarak dünyayı şekillendiriyor.Kimbilir?

  • bir an önce çatışsak şu medeniyetsiz batıyla..bitse bu iş...

  • Vera Tunahan
    Vera Tunahan

    ramak kaldı.
    az daha gayret ederseniz sonunda bu huntington adamının yazdıkları altına imza atmış olacaksınız tüm dünyaca.

  • Aydın Aydın
    Aydın Aydın

    ''Samuel Huntington'un ortaya attığı Medeniyetler çatışması kısaca İslam ve Konfuçyanizm medeniyetlerinin Batı medeniyetleriyle çeliştiği ve çatışma için'de olduğu ve ileride'de çatışmanın devam edeceğini öngörüyor.''

    Mustafa Özcan.

  • Cagla Cayir
    Cagla Cayir

    Samuel Huntington un 1993 yilinda Foreign Affairs dergisinde yayinlanan tezidir.
    Dunya politikasinin yeni bir devreye girecegini belirten Hungtington a gore gulabellesen dunyda artik global sorunlar eskiden oldugu gibi devletler arasinda yasanmiyacaktir.
    Dunyayi esir alacak problemlerin temelinin idolojik veya ekonomik catisma da olmiyacagi kanisindadir ona gore esas nokta kultursel olacaktir ve kulturleri ayiran cografyalarin sinirlarinda yasanacaktir.

    Altta ilgilenenler icin ingilizcesini yaziyorum. Firsat bulursam turkceye cevirecegim.

    Why will this be the case?

    First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily, mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.

    Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by 'good' European Catholic Poles. Americans react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries. Similarly, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out, 'An Ibo may be... an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian. In New York, he is an African.' The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.

    Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled 'fundamentalist.' Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle- class technicians, professionals and business persons. The 'unsecularization of the world,' George Weigel has remarked, 'is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century.' The revival of religion, 'la revanche de Dieu,' as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.

    Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and 'Asianization' in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the 'Hinduization' of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence 're-Islamization' of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.

    In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

    Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was 'Which side are you on? ' and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is 'What are you? ' That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

    Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop with other East Asian countries, its cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration like that in Europe and North America.

    Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed,

    'Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan) , outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and services acumen (Hong Kong) , a fine communications network Singapore) , a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three) , and very large endowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China) .... From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network-often based on extensions of the traditional clans-has been described as the backbone of the East Asian economy.'(1)

    Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization, founded originally in the 1960 by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission to the European Community. Similarly, Caricom, the Central American Common Market and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the Anglo-Latin divide, however, have to date failed.

    As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an 'us' versus 'them' relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. The end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore. Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity gives rise to conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.

    The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro- level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.